アナキーと帝国:世界征服者と国際システム
基本情報
区分 | 講演会等 |
---|---|
対象者 | 在学生 / 留学生 / 卒業生 / 大学生 / 教職員 |
開催日(開催期間) | 2024年10月15日 10時 — 11時30分 |
開催場所 | 本郷地区 |
会場 | 赤門総合研究棟5F 549 MAP |
定員 | 50名 |
参加費 |
無料
|
申込方法 | 要事前申込
以下の参加申込フォームからお申込みください。 https://ifi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/event/18720/ |
申込受付期間 | 2024年10月1日 — 2024年10月11日 |
お問い合わせ先 | 東京大学未来ビジョン研究センター 安全保障ユニット メール: ssu★ifi.u-tokyo.ac.jp (★→@に置き換えて送信してください) |
[開催概要]
Why are some international systems characterized by stable multipolarity while others are conquered to form universal empires? This paper explains systemic variation through a comparison of early modern Europe (the persistence of multipolar anarchy after a failed Ottoman challenge) and greater China (empire after Manchu conquest). Both the Ottomans and the Manchus successfully hybridized steppe and sedentary military techniques that gave them the requisite material capabilities to potentially become “world conquerors.” Nevertheless, the decisive factor explaining these divergent systemic outcomes was the Ottomans’ and Manchus’ differential success in surmounting the legitimation gradient of conquest. The Manchus were more successful than the Ottomans in using cultural statecraft to prevent balancing coalitions, and to encourage bandwagoning and collaboration. Cultural statecraft comprised strategies of co-opting pre-existing symbols of imperial rule, and employing multivocal legitimacy strategies to sequentially appeal to multiple segmented audiences. Multipolar anarchy is thus a contingent outcome in international politics, rather than a constant, which can be extinguished by militarily powerful and culturally agile “world conquerors.”
Why are some international systems characterized by stable multipolarity while others are conquered to form universal empires? This paper explains systemic variation through a comparison of early modern Europe (the persistence of multipolar anarchy after a failed Ottoman challenge) and greater China (empire after Manchu conquest). Both the Ottomans and the Manchus successfully hybridized steppe and sedentary military techniques that gave them the requisite material capabilities to potentially become “world conquerors.” Nevertheless, the decisive factor explaining these divergent systemic outcomes was the Ottomans’ and Manchus’ differential success in surmounting the legitimation gradient of conquest. The Manchus were more successful than the Ottomans in using cultural statecraft to prevent balancing coalitions, and to encourage bandwagoning and collaboration. Cultural statecraft comprised strategies of co-opting pre-existing symbols of imperial rule, and employing multivocal legitimacy strategies to sequentially appeal to multiple segmented audiences. Multipolar anarchy is thus a contingent outcome in international politics, rather than a constant, which can be extinguished by militarily powerful and culturally agile “world conquerors.”